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Corporate Governance of Banks in Nigeria:
Determinants of Board of Directors' Effectiveness
Ukpai Kama and Chuku Chuku*
In the corporate governance of banks, board of directors play a significant role by monitoring and advising
management in the formulation and implementation of strategies. Our hypothesis is that certain characteristics of
banks' board (size, composition and proactiveness) determine the effectiveness of the boards in carrying out its
monitoring and advisory roles. After controlling for heterogeneity and endogeneity using the two-step system
estimator, we find that admitting new members into the board improves bank performance up to a certain point,
'efficient limit', where continuous increase of the board size begins to destroy value. We observed an inverse
relationship between board meetings and bank performance which suggest to us that bank boards that meet more often
are only reacting to bank's poor performance. This challenges the widespread belief that frequent board meetings play
a role that is more proactive than reactive. We agree that bank boards strategically alleviate the problems of
governance in banks and reduce the weakness of other corporate governance mechanisms, especially regulatory and
external governance mechanisms. Hence, empowering boards through incentive packages and enlarged
responsibilities with authority to monitor, sanction, reprimand and advise management will be the way forward for the
Nigerian banking sector.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Board of directors, Banks in Nigeria,
System estimator
JEL Classification: G32, G21, G28, K22
I.Introduction

T

he obvious lesson to be learnt from the collapse of high profile banks like
Lehman Brothers, Barings Bank, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, All
States Trust Bank etc., is that no bank is too big (capital base or otherwise)
to fail. In the past decade, series of crises both locally and globally have
heightened interest in corporate governance practices. These included the
collapse of a number of high profile global firms such as Enron Corporation,
+

Mr. U. Kama is a staff of Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, while Mr. C. Chuku is a NYSC member
with the Procurement and Support Services Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja. The author thanks colleagues in
the Department and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not represent the views of the institution to which they are affiliated or its policy.

Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review

Volume 47/1 March 2009

17

18

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2009

WorldCom and Arthur Andersen. Here in Nigeria, weak corporate governance
was highly implicated in the travails of Unilever, Spring Bank, Cadbury and many
others. A closer examination of the circumstances that ran through these
monumental corporate failures reveals that their weak corporate governance
mechanism was the culprit (visit www.vogon-international.com for details).
Effective corporate governance practice would have ensured proper asset and
liability management, prevented insider abuse and fraud by management and
ensured the realization of the ultimate objective of a firm, which is to maximize
the shareholders value. The implication for banks in emerging markets and,
Nigeria, in particular, is that none of the twenty-four (24) recapitalized banks is
immuned to failure, especially if they have poor corporate governance culture.
Good corporate governance in banks focuses on building strong and effective
boards, protecting shareholders and customers' rights, improving the bank's
control environment, increasing financial and non-financial transparency and
disclosure and ultimately contributing to the development of a sound financial
system which guarantees sustainable economic growth.
Thus, to avoid systemic risk, moral hazard, adverse selection and financial panic
in the system, the continuous compliance of banks with the principles laid out in
the 'Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation'
issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) will have to be sustained.
The purpose of this paper is to show the role that banks board of directors play in
the internal corporate governance of banks, and to investigate the determinants of
board of directors' effectiveness. We posit that certain characteristics of bank
board (size, composition and proactiveness) determine the effectiveness of the
board in carrying out its corporate governance roles, including monitoring,
supervising and advising management on mission and strategies.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2, presents the literature review and the
theoretical and empirical underpinnings of corporate governance research.
Section 3 presents an overview of corporate governance in the Nigerian banking
sub-sector, while section 4 describes the methodology adopted. Section 5,
contains the results of our estimation and finally, section 6 presents the policy
options, directions for future research as well as the concluding remarks.
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Review of Literature

The fundamental insight from which corporate governance research originated is
the realization of the potential problems associated with the separation of
ownership from control that is inherent in the contemporary corporate form of a
firm. These problems have come to be known as 'agency problems”. This insight
dates as far back as 1776 when Adam Smith writing about professional managers
in his Wealth of Nations stated that:
'The Directors of Joint Stock Companies (Banks)… being the managers rather of
other people's money (and not their own)… cannot be well expected that they
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance (as owners)…. Negligence
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail more of less, in the management of
the affairs of such a company” (Smith, 1776: 700).
Following the realization of the potential for negligence and profusion by
managers, several authors have come to define corporate governance from
different viewpoints. For example, Sanda et al. (2005) defined corporate
governance as ways in which all parties (stakeholders) interested in the wellbeing of the firm attempt to ensure that managers and other insiders take measures
that safeguard the interest of the stakeholders. Zingales (1998), views corporate
governance systems as the complex set of constrains that shape the ex-post
bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm. In their work, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) defined corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.
Taking a universal perspective on the issue, Gillian and Starks (1998) defined
corporate governance as the system of laws, rules and factors that control
operations at a company. Here, we present a dynamic definition of corporate
governance as the moderating instrument through which an organization ensures
the optimum allocation of commercial pay-offs among the stakeholders.
Some institutions have defined corporate governance in similar ways. For
example, the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) defines the subject as “a system by which corporations are
governed and controlled with a view to increasing shareholder value and meeting
the expectations of the other stakeholders.” Also, corporate governance is the
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system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board,
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing so, it also
provides the structure through which the company's objectives are set and the
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance (OECD, 1999).
Generally, corporate governance is regarded as the set of structures, processes,
principles and policies that guide the way an institution is directed, administered
and controlled. It includes the relationships amongst the many stakeholders
involved in pursuing the goals for which the institution was established. The
principal stakeholders are the shareholders, board of directors, and management.
Others include employees, suppliers, customers, regulators, government and the
community at large.
Though the basic tenets of corporate governance can be applied to banks, the
relevance of banks in the financial system and the special attributes of opacity,
complexity and heavy regulation inherent in banking business makes the
problems and practice of corporate governance highly specific as are the
mechanisms available to deal with such problems. (Ciancanelli & Reyes, 2001;
Levine, 2004; Macey & O'Hara, 2003; Prowse, 1997)
Levine (2004) distinguishes two related characteristics of banks that make their
governance distinctive. First, banks are more opaque than non-financial firms. In
other words, informational asymmetries are larger in banks than all other sectors
(Furfine, 2001; Macey & O'Hara, 2003 and Morgan, 2002). Bank opacity and
complexity reflects the idiosyncratic nature of banking business and the
difficulties outside stakeholders (for example, equity holders, debt holders,
regulators and customers) face when trying to acquire reliable information about a
bank's health status and operations. This opacity can take the form of loan quality
not being easily observable, financial engineering not being transparent, risk
composition of assets being altered and financial statements proving fictitious
and complicated (Andres & Vallelado, 2008).
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The second specific feature identified by Levine (2004), is that banks are
frequently heavily regulated. The multiple regulation of banks by regulators most
often distorts the behaviour of bankers and inhibits standard corporate
governance practices. The main aim of the regulator is to reduce systemic risk in
the system, and this often conflicts with the main goal of other stakeholders
especially the shareholders, who are interested in the maximization of their share
values (Jensen, 2001; Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Caprio et al., 2007).
Although it is true that monitoring by regulators represents an additional
governance mechanism, their presence may further complicate governance
problems in banks. For example, regulators might suppress competition in favor
of some banks and discipline banks by imposing restrictions on ownership
structures (Prowse, 1997; Macey & O'Hara, 2003). They can also intervene to
limit the power of markets to control the banks (Ciancanelli & Reyes, 2001). In
extreme cases, the regulators may even pursue their own interest as regulators
(Santomero, 1997)
On the other hand, regulation can be viewed as an external corporate governance
mechanism that acts macroeconomically at the banking industry level and
macroeconomically at the individual banks' level to build confidence in the entire
financial system.
Thus, the presence of heavy regulations, informational asymmetries, opaqueness
and conflicts of stakeholder interests in banking business puts a special relevance
on the internal corporate governance mechanisms which has the board of
directors at its apex.
II.1

Theoretical Issues

Adam Smith (1776) appears to be the first economist to address the theoretical
issue of the role of board of directors in the governance of a firm. He observed that
because managers controlled people's money rather than theirs, it cannot be
expected that they should watch over it with anxious vigilance as negligence and
profusion will prevail.
Negligence and profusion in the management of a firm are the consequences of
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the separation of stakeholder (ownership) from management (control) which is
inherent in a modern corporation (John & Senbet, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach,
2003; Gillan, 2006; Sanda et al., 2005). The separation of ownership from
management in a typical Nigerian bank necessitates a Principal-Agent
relationship. Here, the board of directors, professional managers, employees and
corporate insiders are the agents on the one hand and the equity holders, creditors,
clients and regulators are the principal on the other hand.
The agency theory states that in the presence of information asymmetry, the agent
is likely to pursue interests that may be detrimental to the principal (Sanda et al.,
2005). The reason for this is because the pay-off structure of the claims of
different classes of stakeholders (including board of directors) is fundamentally
different. The process of aligning these interests and claims gives rise to potential
conflicts among the stakeholders. Left alone, each class of stakeholder will pursue
its own interest which may be at the expense of other stakeholders and, hence, the
need for a moderating instrument-corporate governance-in a modern firm.
Agency relationships in a firm can be classified on the basis of the interactions
among particular parties in a firm. For example interactions between stockholders
(principal) and management (agent) is referred to as managerial agency or
Managerialism. Interactions between the agents of the public sector (e.g., CBN)
and the rest of the society is termed political agency, whereas, interactions
between the private sector and the public sector is known as social agency1. Our
focus here is, however, on managerial agency.
In recent times, the agency theory has been augmented to include analysis of the
multiplicity of the agency relationships that exist among all stakeholders of a firm
and this has come to be known as the stakeholder theory (Sanda et al., 2005).
Jensen (2001) recognizes the implicit weakness of the stakeholder theory which
requires that managers optimize a multiplex (i.e. multiple and complex) objective
function. This condition violates the proposition that a single-value objective is a
prerequisite for rational behaviour by any firm. In search of a solution, Jensen
(2001) proposed the “enlightened stakeholder theory”, which specifies only one
objective that managers should pursue: the maximization of the long-run value of
the firm.
1

See John & Senbet (1996, 1998) for a detailed classification of agency interactions.
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We have overlooked the theory of the Fisherian Separation Principle as presented
by John and Senbet (1998), because it idealizes the economy and firm and fails to
recognize the special features of opaqueness, heavy regulations and informational
asymmetries which are inherent in banking business.
Following the enlightened stakeholder theory as presented by Jensen (2001), we
hypothesize the following:

II. 2

1.

In the presence of opacity, information asymmetry and heavy
regulation in banks, larger bank boards lead to increased bank
performance since large boards facilitates monitoring and brings
more human capital to advise management.

2.

Given the multiplicity of stakeholder interest, the admittance of
more non-executive directors who are endowed with the
prerequisite knowledge, incentives and abilities to monitor and
advise management will alleviate the conflict of interest among
stakeholders and improve bank value.

3.

Finally, we posit that there is a positive link between the frequency
of board meetings and bank performance.

Empirical Issues

A plethora of empirical works have examined the link between board structure
and firm value (Gillian, 2006). Specifically, researchers have attempted to
provide answers to the following questions: How effective is the board in
performing its monitoring function (Adams & Ferreria, 2003; Andres &
Vallelado, 2008; John & Senbet, 1998)? Does board composition matter (Sanda et
al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Bhagat & Bolton,
2008)? What is the structure and activity of board sub-committees (Klein, 1998;
Klein, 2002; Deli & Gillian, 2000)? What is the role of CEO duality? That is,
where the CEO doubles as chairperson of board (Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley et
al., 1997; Goyal & Park, 2002; Raheja, 2005).
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The two major characteristics of boards that stand out in the literature as having
the greatest impact on board effectiveness and performance are: board size and
board composition and the ratio of non-executive to total directors (Sanda et al.,
2005; John & Senbet, 1998; Denis, 2001). With respect to board size, the
hypothesis tested has generally been that smaller boards are more effective
because they can hold more coordinated discussions, make decisions quickly and
are less easily controlled by management (Denis, 2001). On the other hand, some
authors have tested the hypothesis that larger boards are more effective because
the large size facilitates intensive management supervision and brings more
human capital to advise management (Caprio et al., 2007).
The inherent weakness in large boards is that too many members lead to problems
of coordination, rigidity in decision making and excessive control of CEO,
thereby harming efficiency (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Thus the
effect of board size (small or large) on bank value is a trade-off between
advantages (effective monitoring and advising) and disadvantages (weak
coordination, excessive control and rigidity in decision making). This trade-off
shows up as a non-linear relationship between board size and bank value (Andres
& Vallelado, 2008).
With respect to board composition, the generally tested hypothesis is that
directors who are members of bank management or who are affiliated with those
managers (commonly termed executive directors) are less effective as monitors
and advisers of management than those directors who have no family or business
ties with the bank management, that is, the non-executive directors
The literature emphasizes that it is not enough to skew the boards towards a
concentration of non-executive (outside) members. Rather, it is important that the
members be endowed with the prerequisite knowledge, incentives and abilities
required to monitor, discipline and advise the managers (Harris & Raviv, In
press). On the other hand, disproportionate concentration of non-executive
directors may undermine the advisory and diffusion roles of the board since it
limits the number of insider executives on the board; and insiders (executive
directors) facilitate the diffusion of information and advice from the board to
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management and members of staff (Coles et al., 2008).
Although the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between relative
concentration of non-executive directors on boards and board performance is not
conclusive, virtually all codes of good corporate governance practice
recommends increasing their presence (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Coles et al., 2008).
The review of the literature on the determinants of bank board's effectiveness will
be incomplete if we do not examine the internal functioning and characteristics of
the boards. Larcker et al. (2005) conducted a study on board interlocks and
concluded that 'cozy' (friendly) board relationships limit effective monitoring. In
the same light, Fich & Shivdasani (2006), suggest that the board's ability to
monitor is compromised in firms with several busy directors. In a similar manner,
Vafeas (1999) examined the frequency of board meetings and found explanations
both for and against a positive relationship between the frequency of board
meetings and firm performance. Meetings provide an avenue for board members
to converge and map out strategies on how to monitor managers and operations of
the bank. Hence, the more frequent the meetings, the more proactive the board is,
setting standards and providing participatory leadership. On the other hand, fewer
meetings will suggest an anticipatory board only responding to issues and events
(reactive).
Another important variable that influences the effectiveness of boards is the
compensation structure operational in the banks. Brick et al. (2006) analyzed the
link between board and CEO pay. After controlling for CEO age, tenure,
ownership, board size, among others, the authors concluded that excess
compensation for directors compromises their independence and leads to
overpayment of CEO; a situation which they refer to as 'cronyism,' that is, mutual
back-scratching. Also, committee structure and the expertise of board members
prove to be an explanatory variable in determining the effectiveness of boards.
The presence of financial expertise on boards limits the likelihood of accounting
scams and builds market credibility to earnings and profit announcements of
banks (Anderson et al., 2005; Agrawal & Chadha, 2006; Gillan, 2006).
In addition, the institutional framework within which bank boards operate has
attracted much attention. The interaction of the boards with the laws, regulations,
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capital markets, labor markets, product market and the socio-political
environment shapes the likelihood of failure or success of the boards. Caprio et al.
(2007) show in their study, the importance of legal and institutional rather than
regulatory mechanisms in banking governance. In the same vein, Beck et al.
(2006) showed that empowering private monitoring of banks yields the greatest
benefits in developed countries that have in place legal and institutional systems
that work well. However, the case may be different in a developing country like
Nigeria with weak institutions.
III.

Corporate Governance in the Nigerian Banking Sub-Sector

Corporate governance of banks in Nigeria is principally shaped by the interaction
of the following factors: the legal framework, the regulatory institutions, the
financial system and the banking environment. Generally, the legal
underpinnings for enforcing the practice of corporate governance in banks is
stipulated in the following permissible frameworks: the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) Act, 2007; Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA), 1991 (As
amended); the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act, 2006; the
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 1990; and the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act, 2004. These legal documents and
other internally generated codes by the banks provide the framework for
identifying best practice codes and enforcing the compliance with such codes.
Before the banking sector consolidation, quite a number of banks examined had
revealed severe weaknesses in their corporate governance standards. For
instance; many banks were family owned, so much so that the chairpersons
doubled as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). These weaknesses in corporate
governance practice were evidenced in the high turnover of board and
management staff, gross insider abuses which resulted in huge non-performing
insider related credits, financial engineering, non-compliance with regulatory
requirements, falling ethics, and de-marketing other banks (Kama, 2006). In
particular, free, unrestrictive equity holding led to serious abuses by individuals,
family members and governments. Generally, there was public call for changes in
the structure and organization of bank boards in the industry, particularly after the
consolidation exercise.
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In order to encourage private sector led economy as well as imbibe a good
corporate governance culture, “Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Post
Consolidation” was issued in 2006 and banks were obligated to comply with the
tenets of the Code, including the “Code of Corporate Governance for Nigeria,”
issued by SEC.
The following are highlights of the codes of corporate governance for banks in
post consolidation, issued by the CBN:
Equity Ownership
Government's direct and indirect equity holding in any bank shall be
limited to 10%.
Any equity holding of above 10% by any investor is subject to CBN's prior
approval.
Directors or significant shareholders should not borrow more than 10% of
the bank's paid-up capital without the prior approval of the CBN. The
maximum credit to all insiders should not exceed 60% of the bank's paid up
capital.
Organizational Structure
The responsibilities of the head of Board, that is, the Chairman, should be
clearly separated from that of the head of Management, i.e. MD/CEO.
There should be, as a minimum, the following board committees: Risk
Management Committee, Audit Committee, and Credit Committee.
The number of non-executive directors should be more than that of
executive directors, subject to a maximum board size of 20 directors.
At least (2) non-executive board members should be independent directors
(who do not represent any particular shareholder interest and hold no
special business interest with the bank) appointed by the bank on merit.
Board Performance and Appraisal:
Each board should identify and adopt, in the light of the company's future
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strategy, its critical success factors or key strategic objectives.
There should be annual Board and Directors' review/appraisal covering all
aspects of the Board's structure and composition, responsibilities,
processes and relationships, as well as individual member's competencies
and respective roles in the Board's performance.
Quality of Management:
Appointment to top management positions should be based on merit rather
than some other considerations.
Track record of appointees should be an additional eligibility requirement.
Such records should cover both integrity ('fit and proper' as revealed by the
CBN 'blackbook', CRMS etc) and past performance (visible achievements
in previous place(s) of work).
Reporting Relationship
Officers should be held accountable for duties and responsibilities
attached to their respective offices.
The structure of any bank should clearly define acceptable lines of
responsibility and hierarchy; and
All insider credit applications pertaining to directors and top management
staff (AGM and above) and parties related to them, irrespective of size,
should be sent for consideration and approval to the Board Credit
Committee (BCC), among others.
Recently, the compliance rating of deposit money banks to the laid down codes of
corporate governance in Nigerian had received a triple 'A' rating, following the
adoption of the new code (Phillips, 2007). Many banks are now responding by
carrying out board reforms which are typically in the forms of increasing the
relative proportion of non-executive directors, separating the position of Chief
Executive from Chairperson, increasing board size and requiring board members
to have block holdings, among others (Inam, 2006). These internally engineered
board reforms have proved to be beneficial as banks now enjoy ease of raising
capital, improved business performance, increased customer satisfaction,
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strategic business alliances and improved financial reporting systems (Phillips,
2007; Kama, 2006).
Despite the above positive developments, corporate governance in Nigerian
banks is still confronted by a myriad of challenges. Ibrama (2007) views the
technical incompetency of boards and management, acrimonious relationships
among directors, increased levels of risk, rendition of false returns, poor
integration and development of ICT, accounts and records systems, resurgence of
high level malpractices and ineffective integration of entities as the major
challenges facing Nigerian banks in their bid to comply with 'best practices' of
corporate governance. Also, Alo (2007), highlighted some of the challenges faced
by Nigerian banks including: the challenge of: enlightening stakeholders, putting
in place the appropriate institutional framework, achieving value reorientation,
breaking the poverty trap and bridging the inefficiencies of governance
bureaucracies. It is envisaged that tackling these challenges will create an
enabling environment for Nigerian banks to maintain full compliance with the
laid down tenets of good corporate governance in Nigeria.
As basic prerequisites for the successful practice of good corporate governance in
Nigerian banks, the societal norms and standards relating to accountability,
democratic values, the rule of law, attitudes towards the generation and
acquisition of wealth and the effectiveness of the supervisory and judicial system
will have to be improved upon to ensure zero tolerance for defaulters.
IV

Sample, Variables and Econometric Model

In this section, we describe the sample and variables used in the model. We also
describe the measurement techniques adopted as well as the econometric model
used. We have kept the presentation simple and concise to facilitate
understanding.
IV.1

Data and Sample:

We selected 19 banks out of the total of 24 banks in Nigeria; representing about
79.2 per cent of the entire bank population. Our selection is not based on any
probabilistic technique but on the consistency and availability of the required
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data. The analysis covers the period between 2000 and 2008. Incidentally, this
period coincides with the banking sector consolidation exercise which was
conducted between July 2004 and December 2005. We recognize that this may
have structural effects on our model and have adequately controlled for same.
All the data used for the analysis were extracted from the annual and financial
reports of the respective banks and the Annual Fact Books of the Nigerian Stock
Exchange (NSE).
IV.2

Variables and Measurement:

We proxy board effectiveness by using bank performance, hence we adopted the
Tobin's Q ratio as our prime indicator of bank performance. Following Coles et al.
(2008), we approximate Tobin's Q as book assets minus book equity plus market
value of equity all divided by the book value of assets. Many other studies on
board effectiveness have used this variable as the dependent variable (Sanda at al.,
2005; Caprio et al., 2007; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Andres & Vallelado, 2008).
We measure the size, composition and functioning of boards with the variables
BOARDSIZE, OUTSIDER and MEETYR, respectively. BOARDSIZE is the
board size. That is, the number of persons sitting on the boards. OUTSIDER
represents board composition. That is, the balance between executive and nonexecutive directors. We measure it by finding the proportion of non-executive
(outside) directors in total number of directors. Whereas we used MEETYR to
measure board proactiveness (functioning). MEETYR simply represents the
number of meetings held by the board each year as indicated in their annual
reports.
We further construct a set of control variables to account for the following: bank
size, whether or not the bank merged during the consolidation, whether or not the
CEO was the promoter of the bank, the nature of the banks' business and period
dummies.
The first group of control variable checks for relative bank size, we denote this by
BNKSIZE and we measure it by taking the natural logarithm of the total assets of
the respective banks. Another group of control variable which accounts for
business fusion is BNKMERGE. This distinguishes between banks that
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(1)

2

In most cases, these variables are directly reported in the Annual Reports.
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set. Given that some of our explanatory variables such as board size, composition
and functioning may be determined simultaneously with bank performance
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), it simply implies that we are likely to have
problems of endogeneity.
The general approach to estimating models that do not strictly satisfy the
exogeneity condition is to use a transformation to eliminate the unobserved
effects and introduce instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity
(Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, we adopted Arellano & Bond's (1998) proposal to use
the two-step system estimator with adjusted standard errors for potential
heteroskedasticity. The itinerary of this method considers the unobservable
effects, transforming the variables into first differences and uses the generalized
method of moments (GMM) with instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity
problems.
We used the lags of BOARDSIZE, OUTSIDER and MEETYR, PERIOD
dummies and Tobin's Q as our instrumental variables. To test for model
specification, we employ the J-statistic to test for overidentification of restrictions
and to examine the correlation between the instruments and the error term. Before
proceeding to estimate the model using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) we used Windmeijer (2000) adjustment for small samples to avoid any
potential downward bias in the estimated asymptotic standard errors and to
improve the robustness of our results.
V.

Results and Its Implications

In this section we present descriptive statistics of the data used for the analyses.
This is to aid the reader better appreciate the prevailing board design and
performance indices in Nigerian banks. We also present the results of the
Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) analyses using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) with the two-step system estimator which improves on previous
empirical researches by accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, and chiefly
the endogenous nature of our explanatory variables.
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Descriptive Synopsis:

Table 1 depicts a summary of the descriptive statistics of our variables. Each
variable has 171 observations which represent data for 19 out of 24 Nigerian
banks between the years 2000 and 2008.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev

Skwn.

Max.

Min.

Obs.

Board Structure
BOARD SIZE

13.07

12.00

3.26

0.62

20.00

8.00

171.00

OUTSIDERS

0.51

0.58

0.09

0.44

0.60

0.37

171.00

MEETYR

6.72

7.00

1.97

0.60

12.00

3.00

171.00

180.43

144.00

92.32

1.07

400.00

64.00

171.00

BNKSIZE

27.03

27.55

1.65

-1.75

29.51

20.06

171.00

LONASS

0.35

0.33

0.11

0.00

0.55

0.10

171.00

Tobin's Q

1.21

1.14

0.20

2.09

1.90

-0.04

171.00

ROA

2.22

1.90

0.82

0.78

4.00

1.00

171.00

BOARD SIZE SQ.
Bank
Characteristics

Bank Performance

From the Table, we observe that the mean and median sizes of bank boards in
Nigeria are 13.07 and 12, respectively. This is significantly higher than the
average and median sizes of 8.45 and 6 reported for non-financial firms in Nigeria
(Sanda et al., 2005). Our measure of board composition (OUTSIDER) reveals
that on average, 51 per cent of board members in Nigerian banks are nonexecutive directors. Since the median board size consists of 12 members, it
implies that a typical Nigerian bank has about six non-executive and six executive
directors. The number of meetings held by boards in a year which is our proxy for
board proactiveness indicates that on average, bank boards hold meetings 6.72
times a year. With a positive skew of 0.6, we conclude that most banks boards,
hold meetings more than six times a year.
Our measure of the structure of bank business (BNKSIZE) which we constructed
as the natural log of a bank's total assets (a control variable) indicates a mean and
median of 27.03 and 27.55 with a negative skew of -1.75 and 1.65 standard
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deviation, suggesting that there are more banks with relatively smaller total assets
than a few with relatively very large assets.
A second control variable (LONASS) which is constructed as the ratio of loans
and advances to total assets indicates an average of 0.35, implying that an average
Nigerian bank has about 35 per cent of its total assets in loans and advances. This is
less than the average of 49 per cent reported for selected OECD countries by
Andres & Vallelado (2008).
Our measures of performance (TOBIN'Q and ROA) reveal averages of 1.21 and
2.22 per cent, respectively. Both averages are significantly higher than 1.15 and 1
per cent reported for banks in selected developed countries (Andres & Vallelado,
2008).
V.2

Two-Step System Estimation Results

In Table 2, we report the results of our estimation. We indicate the estimated
coefficients of the variables with their corresponding probability values. We show
the J-statistic which we used to test for the validity of over-identifying restrictions,
we also presented the first and second order autocorrelation test and the F test of
overall model statistical significance.
The results of our estimation do not reject the rationality of our model and
confirms the absence of first and second-order serial correlation. The suitability of
our instrument list which takes care of endogeneity is confirmed by the J-statistic.
We observed a positive and significant relation between BOARDSIZE and both
measures of bank performance. The implication is that the admittance of
additional members into the board improves bank performance though with a
diminishing marginal growth. This result is consistent with the hypothesized
inverted U-shaped relation between board size (BOARDSIZE) and bank
performance (TOBIN'Q or ROA) as presented in Andres & Vallelado (2008).
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Table 2. Estimated Relationship between Board Structure and Bank
Performance in Nigeria.
TOBIN's Q

ROA

Independent and
Control Variables

Coef.

P>|t|

Coef.

P>|t|

BOARDSIZE

0.0894

0.014**

0.6250

0.0413**

BOARDSIZE SQ.

-0.0037

0.0457**

-0.0266

0.0298**

OUTSIDER

0.0177

0.0454**

0.2224

0.0173**

MEETYR

-0.0555

0.0565*

-0.0395

0.0902*

BNKSIZE

0.0104

0.0919*

-0.3269

0.5852

LONASS

-0.1878

0.0894*

-7.6045

0.0185**

BNKMERGE

-0.2467

0.8337

-10.2176

0.3602

PERIOD 02

0.0805

0.3440

0.2791

0.6104

PERIOD 03

0.0312

0.0824*

-0.5822

0.0308**

PERIOD 04

0.0629

0.0003***

-0.1014

0.0779**

PERIOD 05

-0.0801

0.0492**

1.2504

0.0366**

PERIOD 06

0.0591

0.3152

-0.4572

0.2943

PERIOD 07

0.0387

0.5233

0.0130

0.9744

PERIOD 08

-0.0369

0.0741*

0.5375

0.2108

OPT. BOARDSIZE

14.0000

F test

19.7601

0.0000***

J-Statistic

5.2857

AR1
AR2

13.0000

23.9204

0.0000***

0.6163

5.3561

0.0000***

-0.9305

0.3060

-0.9841

0.3082

-0.6803

0.4869

-0.7106

0.5106

* (**) and (***) denotes rejection of the hypotheses at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively

The negative and significant coefficient for the square of board size
(BOARDSIZE SQ) suggests that there is an optimum point at which admitting a
new director reduces bank performance. For Nigerian banks, the optimum
number is between thirteen and fourteen members. We note that this is the board
size that maximizes the objective function.
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We observed a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of
non-executive directors (OUTSIDER) and bank performance. This result is
consistent with the theory and validates the argument that admitting nonexecutive directors into the board improves its monitoring and advisory role to
management and helps to align the interests of various classes of stakeholders.
Unlike the traditional results in previous empirical researches, we observed a
negative and significant relationship between bank board meeting and bank
performance. This result suggest to us that frequent meetings by bank boards are a
response to bank's poor performance, implying that the boards rather than being
proactive are reactive to poor performance, thereby meeting often to design,
monitor and advise management on strategies to adopt.
Precisely, our results point to the relevance of corporate governance variables in
determining bank performance in Nigeria. Therefore, our results confirm the view
that some bank boards characteristics (size, composition and proactiveness) may
be associated with either effectiveness or ineffectiveness in the discharge of its
monitoring and advisory role to management.
VI.

Policy Implications, Directions for Future Research and Concluding
Remarks

In this section, we present policy options available to stakeholders of the banking
industry in Nigeria. We also present directions for future research on corporate
governance and its relation to bank performance and end with some concluding
remarks.
Policy Implications
To guarantee the maximization of shareholder's value and, hence, economic
growth, bank boards should be 'efficiently' sized. Stakeholders should engage
researchers to obtain the optimum size of boards that achieves the objective
function for their respective industries and size their boards plus or minus two
standard deviation of the optimum value. In our case, the optimum size of bank
boards in Nigeria is 13. Therefore, for any Nigerian bank to operate anywhere
around the optimum the board size should be between 11 and 15.
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To ensure that bank boards are efficient and that there is minimal or no conflict
between the various classes of stakeholders and management, bank boards should
have the optimal mix of directors. From our results, a relatively balanced mix
(equal number of executive and non-executive members) as against the prevailing
code which states that the number of non-executive directors should be more than
that of executive directors subject to a maximum of 20 directors, will be the
recommended combination. As a prerequisite, an implementable legal framework
must be put in place to govern the contractual agreements between stakeholders
and boards of directors. For instance, all board members can be made to sign a
bond that specifically stipulates their roles in the agency agreement which
includes ensuring the maximization of the objective function of the bank.
Further, stakeholders (including regulators) have the option of motivating board
members to be more efficient by providing incentive packages to induce board
3
members to act in desired ways . Also, stakeholders may decide to monitor board
members directly or indirectly by engaging consultants to do the monitoring were
they do not have the expertise to do so.
Directions for Future Research:
In the course of this study, we observed that there is a relative dearth of theoretical
and empirical work on corporate governance and bank performance in
underdeveloped and emerging economies. The fragility of emerging and
underdeveloped economies put a special relevance on the applicability of good
corporate governance mechanisms, especially in banks. There is need for
researchers to beam their search light on the impact of socio-political shocks on
the corporate governance of banks and non-financial firms.
It is also of relevance that we focus on understanding the interaction among
multiple governance mechanisms. That is, incorporating traditional means of
governance such as social, cultural, family and religious dimensions to the
governance of banks (firms). This will greatly improve our knowledge of
corporate governance, especially in emerging markets that have strong ties with
social systems.
Importantly, from a fundamental viewpoint, there is a strong need to further
3

See Denis ( 2001) for details of possible incentive packages for board members
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develop structural models and quantitative theories of the firm to guide future
empirical work.
Lastly, there is a strong requirement for a unified corporate body saddled with the
responsibility of collecting and collating corporate governance related data in
emerging markets and constructing the relevant indices to facilitate corporate
governance research in emerging markets like Nigeria.
Concluding Remarks
In the corporate governance of banks, banks' board of directors play a significant
role by monitoring and advising management on the formulation and
implementation of strategies. Our hypothesis was that certain characteristics of
bank boards (size, composition and proactiveness) determine the effectiveness of
the board in carrying out its monitoring and advisory roles.
After controlling for heterogeneity and endogeneity using the two-step system
estimator, we found that admitting new board members improves bank
performance up to a certain point, 'efficient limit', where continuous increase of
the board size begins to destroy value. We also obtained empirical evidence which
agreed with popular codes of good corporate governance practice, that is,
increasing the proportion of non-executive directors in the board improves bank
value.
Our third finding challenges the widespread belief that frequent board meetings
play a role that was more proactive than reactive. We observed an inverse
relationship between board meetings and bank performancewhich suggests to us
that bank boards that meet more often are only reacting to the bank's poor
performance. All our findings were consistent after controlling for ownership
structure (CEOP), bank size (BNKSIZE), and the effect of the 2004 regulatory
shock (BNKMERGE).
Finally, bank boards strategically alleviate the problems of governance in banks
and reduce the weakness of other corporate governance mechanisms (especially
the regulatory and external governance mechanisms). Hence, empowering boards
through incentives packages and an enlarged purview of authority and
responsibility to monitor, sanction, reprimand and advise management will be the
way forward for the growth and development of the banking sub-sector in
Nigeria.
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